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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the building of a Monetary Union in Europe 
(EMU), and in so doing, addresses three key questions: Is it economically 
beneficial? Where does it stand at present? And where is it going? 
The first question refers to the costs and benefits of EMU. While the 
paper concludes that EMU is likely to be beneficial for the Community as a 
whole, the countries which will profit the most are those whose economies are 
more diversified, more integrated in commercial and financial terms and, most 
importantly J those whose goods and labour markets are freer from structural 
rigidities. 
The second question addressed concerns the transition to EMU during 
Stage Two . It is concluded that only by strengthening policy-coordination 
among member countries J and by implementing the necessary changes to 
safeguard the cohesion of the ERM in the presence of speculative attacks J will 
it be possible to maintain monetary and exchange rate stability in an 
environment of liberalized capital flows. The recent creation of the European 
Monetary Institute and the automatic introduction by the Treaty of Maastricht 
of a number of changes in the economic and financial framework during the 
transition may facilitate achieving the above objectives. 
The third question refers to the design of the future European 
monetary policy. Since the whole balance between the costs and benefits to be 
obtained from EMU depends critically on the anti-inflationary orientation of the 
future monetary policy to be conducted by the European System of Central 
Banks J the paper analyses the role of central bank independence as well as the 
complexities involved in moving to a single European monetary policy. The pros 
and cons of different alternatives for formulating and executing the European 
monetary policy are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rationale behind the recent enactment of the Treaty of Maastricht 
for the purpose of creating an economic and monetary union in the European 
Community (EC) within the present decade cannot be understood unless we link 
it with the numerous attempts by Western European countries in the last 
twenty-five years to create a zone of exchange rate stability. Already at the 
end of the sixties) there was significant resolve on the part of political1eaders 
in Europe to proceed towards monetary integration. This led in 1970 to the 50-
called Werner Plan, which sought to deepen and consolidate the then prevailing 
environment of stable exchange rates by moving towards a single European 
currency managed by a newly created European monetary authority!. Although 
the Plan was adopted on March 1971 by the Council of Economic and Finance 
Ministers of the Community, the end of Bretton Woods unfortunately prevented 
its implementation. 
While the new international situation led to the shelving of the most 
ambitious parts of the Werner Plan, it did not change the basic attitude of the 
authorities of Member States of the Community in favour of preserving a higher 
degree of exchange rate stability among themselves even in the new 
environment of generalised floating. This favourable attitude towards stable 
exchange rates was exemplified by the creation of "the Snake" in 1972 and by 
the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. More 
recently , the drive towards monetary integration in Europe gained new 
momentum towards the end of the eighties when, acting upon a mandate by the 
European Council, a Committee formed by the Governors of the Central Banks 
of the Community plus a few independent experts and chaired by Jacques 
Delors, President of the European Commission, produced a Report which 
identified the steps to be taken in moving towards a monetary union in the 
Community' . 
Unlike with the Werner Plan, much bas happened as a result of the 
publication of the Delors Report and its adoption at the European Council of 
Madrid in June 1989. In particular, it was followed by an Inter-Governmental 
Conference where Member States discussed how the Treaty of Rome should be 
amended to allow the establishment of a full Economic and Monetary Union 
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(EMU). The successful discussions led to the signature in February 1992 of the 
Treaty on European Union at the Dutch city of Maastricht by the Heads of State 
or Government of Community countries3• In the following months the Treaty 
was ratified -although not without some difficulties- by Member States, 
becoming effective on November 1st 1993. 
The foregoing description of the drive towards monetary integration 
in Western Europe, in contrast to attitudes prevailing in other parts of the 
world, cannot however be understood in isolation. In effect, the continuing 
desire to preserve a zone of exchange rate stability and to transform it over 
time into a monetary union has been strengthened by the gradual deepening of 
economic integration in the Community, which has recently been accelerated by 
the Single European Act of 1986 and by the subsequent creation of the Single 
Market on January 1st 1993. Indeed, while the degree.of the Community's trade 
openness vis-a.-vis the rest of the world has increased by roughly 30% since its 
creation, intra-EC trade has almost doubled in this period4• Nevertheless, this 
process cannot be viewed as only uni-directional; the maintenance of a 
relatively high degree of exchange rate stability is generally considered to have 
also promoted in the medium-term closer trade �nd financial interlinkages among 
the economies of Member States. 
The recent entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty represents a 
major step forward in the Community's integration process given its importance 
in the economic and monetary fields and its far-reaching political implications. 
Furthermore, the process towards monetary integration in the European 
Community is all the more remarkable if we take into account several other 
factors. Firstly, it has gathered speed precisely at the time when previously 
existing monetary unions were disintegrating in Central and Eastern Europe, 
following the abandonment of socialism and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the Treaty of Maastricht has 
become legally valid in spite of a very unfavourable international economic 
climate. 
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The above notwithstanding, there are still many important obstacles 
to be overcome before achieving the ambitious goals set out in the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Indeed, the recent instability within the EMS reminds us of the 
difficulties of the transition to full economic and monetary union in a world of 
free capital movements. In addition, Member States' economies may not find it 
easy to satisfy the convergence criteria established to regulate access to EMU, 
thus casting a shadow of doubt on the timetable envisaged in the Treaty. 
Finally, the preparation of the future single monetary policy is a highly complex 
matter, especially when account is taken of the significant strategic and tactical 
differences which prevail at present among the national monetary policies of 
Member States. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the building of a Monetary 
Union in Europe, and in doing so, to address several key questions. Is it 
economically beneficial? Where does it stand at present? And where is it going? 
The first question refers to the costs and benefits of EMU. Although 
the widely held view in official Community circles is that the economic benefits 
of forming a monetary union in the Community grossly outweigh the economic 
costs, this issue is still highly debated in the literature. In fact, several 
distinguished academics have gone so far as to argue recently that building a 
European Economic and Monetary Union is likely to be costly from an economic 
viewpoint but that this may be a necessary price to pay to achieve the superior 
benefit of Political Unions. In order to clarify the economic rationale behind the 
European monetary integration process, Section I of the paper identifies the 
main economic costs and benefits which are likely to emerge from EMU and 
assesses its overall desirability. 
The second question addressed in the paper concerns the transition 
to EMU. A main challenge facing European policy-makers during the transitional 
period is to maintain monetary and exchange rate stability in an environment of 
liberalised capital flows. Since the Treaty of Maastricht envisages that monetary 
sovereignty will remain firmly in the hands of the national authorities until such 
time EMU is established, there is a need to co-ordinate national policies if major 
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problems are to be avoided. Section II of the paper addresses the main issues 
likely to arise in the transition to EMU and discusses the main changes in the 
economic and monetary framework taking place during this period. 
The final question tackled in the paper refers to the design of the 
future single monetary policy and to the complexities involved in moving from 
a system of different national monetary policies geared to achieving different 
Objectives to a single European monetary policy oriented towards a single 
objective for the Union as a whole. Section III of the paper comments on the 
institutional design of the European System of Central Banks as regards its role 
as guardian of price stability. It also seeks to identify the main strategic and 
tactical issues that need to be reckoned with in preparing the future European 
monetary policy and compares various options as to how to move forward. 
The concluding section of the paper summarises the main policy 
implications. 
I. IS EMU WORTHWHILE? SETTING COSTS AGAINST BENEFITS 
A currency union or monetary union is typically defined as an area 
where a "single currencylt circulates. Logically, this means that a Itsingle 
monetary policy" exists for the area as a whole, regardless of whether there is 
one or more monetary authorities. 
In the European case, the so-called Economic and Monetary Union 
differs slightly from the previous definition since it implies: (I) a single 
market) where goods) services and factors circulate freely j (ti) irrevocably 
fixed exchange rates among participating currencies, and soon after a single 
currency; (iii) a single monetary authority implementing a single monetary 
policy; and (iv) binding rules on the size of budget deficits and public debt, 
and on the financing of deficits. 
In discussing the economic rationale behind of European monetary 
integration and the costs and benefits involved in moving towards a monetary 
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union, it is very important to start by identifying the alternative against which 
EMU is to be set6• 
Before mid-1992, most countries in the European Community seemed 
to have voluntarily relinquished to making use of the nominal exchange rate as 
a tool for adjusting their economies, as exemplified by the extended period -
from January 1987 to August 1992- without realignments in the ERM. At'the 
time, the prevailing view was that moving towards a monetary union could not 
involve much greater costs than those already endured within the ERM but 
would instead allow further significant benefits to be gained in the form of 
absence of transaction costs J etc. 
The situation nowadays ·seem to be different following the recent 
crises that have beset"the ERM. Indeed, the problems faced in recent years by 
a number of ERM countries in adapting their interest rates to those prevailing 
in the anchor country in the presence of very weak domestic economic 
conditions, and the apparent stimulatory impact of the relaxation of Britain's 
monetary policy following the exit of Sterling from the ERM, have contributed 
to reopening the debate about the desirability and sustainability of EMU. 
Indeed, what has happened is that the situation with which EMU is to be 
compared Is no longer one of de facto nominal exchange stability but one where, 
as shown by recent events J nominal exchange rates can be moved. 
There follows an assessment of the main economic costs and benefits 
involved in moving from the present situation to EMU7• 
1.1. Economic benefits 
An initial benefit from EMU is the reduction in transaction costs 
derived from replacing the various national,currencies now circulating in the 
Community by a single currency. As is known, the costs involved in 
exchanging different currencies constitute a net deadweight loss for society as 
a whole. Another matter is how significant it is in practice. In this regard, 
although it is rather difficult to arrive at reliable estimates of the magnitude of 
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the savings involved, official estimates by the Commission suggest a figure of 
0.5% of GDP for the Community as a whole, rising even to 1% in the case of the 
smaller more open economies. Although these figures are not very high they are 
nevertheless far from insignificant. 
A second benefit from EMU would be the elimination of th� degree of 
uncertainty presently associated with exchange rate movements. By reducing 
real exchange variability, it will likely lead to a decrease in the risk premium 
built into real interest rates. In turn, this would tend to enhance productive 
investment by making attractive those projects which are not currently 
undertaken due to the relatively high cost of capital. Commission (1990) 
estimates of the likely empirical magnitude of this effect indicate that a 
reduction of risk premia by 0.5 percentage points would tend to increase income 
in the Community by 5-10% in the long run. 
While I am convinced that the disappearance of exchange rate 
uncertainty, under certain conditions, may shape a more favourable 
environment for investment and production, I am somewhat skeptical about the 
foregoing figures. As explained by De Grauwe (1992), while a reduction of 
uncertainty in foreign exchange markets may lead to a reduction in the real 
interest rate, it would also lead to a lower stream of corporate profits. This is, 
in turn, consistent with the absence of very significant empirical effects of 
exchange rate variability on investment, thus suggesting that the magnitude 
of the final effect on income may not be as high as suggested by official 
estimates. 
Where I believe that the economic benefits from EMU may be largest 
is in further promoting market integration. According to official Commission 
(1988) estimates, the economic rewards from full market integration in the EC 
could amount to an extra 2% of the Community's GDP. While the evidence about 
the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade and foreign direct investment 
is rather inconclusive, I think few people would dispute the idea that market 
integration is easier to achieve when wild swings in exchange rates are absent. 
Indeed, a single European currency may foster socio-economic integration 
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through channels which are far more important and difficult to capture by 
econometric research than those discussed above. In contrast, the presence of 
exchange rate instability may well act as a barrier which prevents reaping the 
full benefits resulting from the Single Internal Market. Thus , although a single 
currency may not be absolutely necessary from an economic viewpoint for the 
workings of a single market, it may greatly increase the economic gains derived 
from the latter. 
Consider, for example, the case of discriminatory pricing . In the EC 
it has been observed that the national prices of very similar tradeable goods are 
often quite different across national markets when converted into a common 
currency , even after removing the effect of trade barriers . Specifically, prices 
can be as low as 70% and as high as 170% of the average. Although it is not easy 
to calculate the economic benefits resulting from abolishing discriminatory 
pricing, the above figures suggest that they may well be significant. 
All in all, I am very doubtful that European economies would have 
become as integrated as they are now in the absence of the relatively high 
degree of exchange rate stability which they have enjoyed within the ERM. 
Furthermore , the recent "Hoover affair" clearly suggests that having a single 
market without stable exchange rates may not be sustainable on political 
grounds . Indeed, as actual situations show, a single market tends to be 
associated with a single currency while many currencies tend to be associated 
with different markets'. 
The creation of EMU may also be beneficial on purely macroeconomic 
grounds by strengthening price stability within the Union. Clearly, the 
informational value of having a single money circulating in a wider area would 
be larger the more stable its value is. However, the effects of introducing a 
single currency on price performance are critically dependent on the 
institutional design and behaviour of the new supranational monetary authority . 
Since this issue is addressed in detail in Section III of the paper, I will just 
mention at this stage that in so far as EMU succeeds in promoting price 
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stability, tills would greatly enhance the efficiency of resource allocation and 
thus provide the basis for sustained growth. 
Finally, there may be benefits from EMU in that it helps the single 
European currency become an international reserve currency. However, the 
consensus on this issue currently seems to be that these effects are likely to be 
smaller than generally believed given the various institutional and historical 
factors that limit shifts among currencies, and the potential desire of investors 
to hold larger amounts of non-European currencies for diversification purposes 
(Eichengreen, 1992). 
In sum, willIe EMU is likely to provide significant benefits to EC 
countries, it must be acknowledged that some of these benefits are rather hard 
to quantify. My own opinion is that the largest benefits will come from fostering 
the degree of economic and financial integration among Community countries in 
an environment of nominal stability. Thus, the countries which have more to 
gain are those which are now relatively open, those that will become more open 
precisely as a result of being EMU members, and those with relatively higher 
inflation rates at present. 
Having succinctly described the main economic benefits from EMU, 
I shall now turn to examining its economic costs. 
1. 2. Economic costs 
The major potential cost involved in forming a monetary union is 
forgoing the use of the nominal exchange rate as a tool for macroeconomic 
adjustment. However, the size of this cost will depend on several factors: the 
nature of the shocks; the degree of international factor mobility; the degree of 
wage and price flexibility; and the degree to which fiscal policy is orientated 
towards macroeconomic stability. In order to assess how important these 
considerations could be in a future European Monetary Union, each of them is 
discussed in some detail in what follows. 
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I . 2 . 1. The nB ture of shocks 
The loss involved in not making use of the nominal exchange rate as 
an instrument for macroeconomic adjustment will be, ceteris paribus, smaller 
when shocks require little movement of the real exchange rate to reestablish 
equilibrium. Normally, this tends to happen when shocks across the Union are 
symmetric rather than asymmetric or idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that even common shocks may have very asymmetric effects through the 
Union if economic structures differ across countries. For this reason, it is 
appropriate to define a shock as being "symmetric" when its effects are roughly 
similar across the Union and thus no real exchange rate adjustment is required 
to restore equilibrium. 
In order to infer how symmetric shocks could be in EMU, the 
empirical evidence has generally looked at the present situation in the EC and 
has taken the United States as a standard for comparison. Nevertheless, the 
evidence is not uncontroversial. 
For example, recent studies by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and 
Eichengreen (1992) have concluded that idiC?syncratic shocks tend to be more 
frequent in the EC than in the US which, prima facie) would seem to suggest 
that the EC might find it rather costly to become a currency union from a 
macroeconomic viewpoint. Nevertheless, they also find, as do De Grauwe and 
Vanhaverbeke (1993) and other researchers, that the degree of asymmetries is 
considerably smaller and thus more similar to that of the US if one takes the 
subset of EC countries which have traditionally maintained closer economic and 
monetary links with Germany. In contrast to the above studies, Bini-Smaghi 
and Vori (1993) conclude that EC economies, especially the six founding 
members, are more diversified than US regions in their production structures 
and thus are less likely to be subject to asymmetric shocks. In addition, 
Stockman (1988), Baxter and Stockman (1989) and European Commission (1990) 
find that "industry-specific" shocks are more Significant than "country­
specific" shocks in the Community. 
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Evidently J an unavoidable problem that arises when interpreting the 
above mentioned empirical results is that they are drawn from comparing the 
historical performance of a group of countries that have not yet formed a 
monetary union with that of US regions, which have been long-standing 
members of a union. In short, the analysis could be biased because it might be 
the case that certain patterns of behaviour now observed in the EC would tend 
to evolve towards those in the US as economic and monetary integration 
advanced. 
Consider the case of monetary policy shocks. At present, these are 
country-specific shocks which result from imperfectly coordinated national 
monetary policies, currency substitution and exchange rate movements. This 
source of asymmetries would disappear instantaneously once EMU were formed 
and the single monetary policy implemented. Official estimates by the 
Commission (1990) indicate that this effect is li�ely to be significant. On the 
real side, the main issue for concern is whether the deepening of economic and 
monetary integration will be associated with a tendency towards productive 
diversification or specialisation in the Community. As Kenen (1969) argued 
years ago, the more diversified the industrial structure of countries is, the 
more likely it is that "industry-wide" shocks do not translate into "country­
wide" shocks. In this respect, there are two opposing forces to be considered. 
On the one hand, since most intra-Community trade takes the form of 
"intra-industry" trade, this implies that Member States exchange very similar 
goods. Thus, foreseeably, deeper integration may contribute to further 
diversifying national production structures within the EC, lessening the role 
of asymmetric or "country-wide" shocks. On the other hand, work by Krugman 
(1993) suggests that the EC could move in the direction of the US, with higher 
regional specialisation. Indeed, the existence of increasing returns to scale and 
"thick-market" externalities could lead to a regional concentration of 
production, thus making "industry-wide" shocks "region-wide" shocks as well. 
While I think that the point made by Krugman is a very valid one, and 
that overall there may be a tendency in EMU towards regional specialisation 
rather than diversification, I nevertheless doubt whether regional and national 
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specialisation are necessarily the same thing. In particular, even if a given 
industry concentrates on a given geographical region, such region might very 
well spread across several countries. In that case, "industry-wide" and 
"region-wide" shocks may coincide but diverge from "country-wide" shocks. 
From the above discussion, I would draw the following conclusions: 
firstly, it is likely that symmetric shocks would prevail in EMU; secondly, the 
presence of symmetric shocks may be relatively more important in those EC 
countries which have traditionally maintained closer economic and monetary ties 
with Germany; and thirdly, since asymmetric shocks will still exist, it is 
important that adjustment mechanisms are found to deal with them in EMU. 
I. 2. 2 Adjusting to asymmetric shocks 
In this sub-section I discuss the likely role of alternative mechanisms 
in adjusting to asymmetric shocks in EMU: labour mobility, wage and price 
flexibility, and fiscal policy. 
Labour mobility 
In so far as large asymmetric shocks exist and wage and price 
flexibility is not complete, macroeconomic stability within EMU will require other 
adjustment mechanisms. The classical one, first outlined by Mundell (1961), is 
the international mobility of factors of production and, in particular, of labour. 
If there is a shift in relative demand across countries, and if the real exchange 
rate does not adjust, there will be unemployment in the country where demand 
has been reduced unless there is migration towards the country where demand 
has increased. 
As regards the usefulness of intercountry labour mobility as a 
cushioning device for shocks in EMU, recent studies9 find that labour 
movements across EC countries are very limited and significantly smaller than 
across US regions. Further analysis has also tended to confirm that the very 
small size of labour movements in the Community. does not come from low 
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incentives to move but rather from a very low degree of labour mobility (Le. , 
the size of the response of migration to a given economic incentive to migrate) . 
While it might be argued that labour mobility might increase as economic and 
monetary integration proceeds, it should be acknowledged that the presence of 
numerous historical, cultural and linguistic differences in European countries 
would prevent much higher migration than is currently the case, at least for 
many years after EMU is formed . 
The above evidence of low labour movements and low labour mobility 
has been traditionally interpreted as indicating that migration will be an 
extremely limited tool to cope with asymmetric shocks in EMU. Although this 
channel could become more important over time, the US experience suggests 
that this is likely to take several decades. 
Wages and prices 
When shocks have asymmetric effects across countries , a movement 
of the real exchange is required to restore macroeconomic equilibrium. If wages 
and prices were to adjust costlessly, they would induce a prompt 
re-equilibrating response of the real exchange rate and there would be no loss 
from forgoing the present degree of nominal exchange rate flexibility. 
Unfortunately, experience shows that in EC economies structural rigidities in 
national labour markets make wages respond quite slowly to increasing 
unemployment while structural rigidities in non-tradeable goods markets limit 
the downward response of prices. 
While wages and prices may not be flexible enough nowadays in the 
EC to cope with asymmetric shocks, some expect that EMU itself might reinforce 
the degree of wage and price flexibility in so far as the absence of residual 
exchange rate flexibility improves the behaviour of wage and price setters. I 
am rather more guarded on this issue. The recent experience of the ERM tends 
to suggest generally modest effects in the form of an "anti-inflationary 
credibility bonus" for higher inflation countrieslO• In addition, the recent 
experience in Germany following unification suggests that there may even be 
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a perverse "wage catching-up" effect which, at least initially, undermines 
downward flexibility. Consequently, restoring a higher degree of wage and 
price flexibility in EC countries is likely to require both a firm and balanced 
anti-inflationary macroeconomic policy stance, and the implementation of wide­
ranging supply-side pOlicies aimed at improving the workings of labour and 
goods markets. If such policies are pursued, EMU may well amplify their 
beneficial effects on wage and price flexibility. 
Let us assume for a moment, however, that the necessary structural 
reform policies do not take place and that EMU does not by itself alter the 
processes of wage and price formation. How costly is EMU then likely to be? 
In order to answer the above question, one must first ascertain how 
effective the nominal exchange rate actually is in facilitating real exchange rate 
adjustment in European countries. Clearly, I am not referring to a situation 
where the nominal eXChange rate is used in an activist and systematic way by 
the authorities. As it is widely acknowledged, the systematic use of monetary 
or exchange rate policy will not be very effective in altering real variables once 
private agents take into account the behaviour of the authorities in their 
decisions, and may even lead to an inflationary bias!!. Rather, what I am 
referring to is a more exceptional situation where the nominal exchange is used 
as a "corrective device" to restore equilibrium among relative prices and among 
relative asset supplies and demands following a significant shock. 
The effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate as a tool for 
facilitating macroeconomic adjustment depends fundamentally on how open the 
economy is, as Mckinnon (1963) noted years ago, and also on how rigid real 
wages are. 
As regards openness, the more open EC economies are to intra-EC 
trade and the greater the substitutability of their tradeable goods, the quicker 
the pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic prices will be and the 
smaller the final effect on the real exchange rate. If we measure openness by 
the size of intra-EC exports as a percent of GOP, the most open economies are 
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Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands J with shares between 40 and 50%. Then 
comes an intermediate group made up of Portugal, Germany, Denmark, France 
and Greece with shares between 11 and 20%. A final group, made up of the 
United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, has shares between 7 and 10%. Clearly, 
openness reduces the importance of using intra-EC exchange rate flexibility for 
macroeconomic adjustment to a significant extent in the three most open 
economies but not really in the rest. 
As regards real wage rigidity J it is well known that even in rather 
closed economies nominal exchange rate movements are likely to have little 
impact on the real exchange rate in the presence of real wage rigidity. Various 
studies have recently looked at the behaviour of wages in industrial countries, 
and some others have analyzed the implications for EMUI2• My own 
interpretation of the evidence is that while real wage rigidities are certainly a 
lot higher in Europe than in the US, they are not so high as to prevent the 
nominal exchange rate from playing a role in facilitating the adjustment of real 
exchange rates. Furthermore, the situation tends to differ quite significantly 
among EC countries since some have as much as three times as high a degree of 
real wage rigidity as others. 
From the above examination of wage and price flexibility, it can be 
concluded that the present state of national goods and labour markets does not 
guarantee a smooth macroeconomic adjustment in a number of EC countries in 
the wake of asymmetric shocks. This highlights the need for the rapid 
introduction of structural reforms to improve wage and price flexibility, 
especially in those EC countries with more differentiated economic structures. 
Fiscal policy 
If labour mobility is low J and if wages and prices are slow to adjust, 
what is then left to cope with the problems posed in EMU by "country-wide" 
asymmetric shocks? The typical answer is fiscal policy. What is not so clear is 
whether it suffices to conduct it at the national level or whether it would be 
necessary to do so at the Union-wide level. 
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In keeping with the "subsidiarity principle" , the Treaty of Maastricht 
does not at present envisage the creation of a supranational fiscal authority in 
the Community. This has been interpreted in some quarters as an undesirable 
feature which could jeopardise the stability of EMU. In this regard, it is often 
painted out that the empirical evidence available in existing monetary unions 
confirms that the central government's budget plays an important role in 
smoothing cyclical divergences among the country's regions. Specifically, 
empirical results indicate that in the US between 10 and 28% of a given change 
in regional income is automatically offset through the central budget, and that 
these numbers range between 33 and 42% in Community countries \3 • 
Of course, one should be careful not to extrapolate these results 
automatically to the future EMU. In particular, the "local" authorities of the 
above countries generally do not play any active role in pursuing compensatory 
fiscal policies, which is the responsibility of the' central authorities. In 
contrast, in the case of EMU, since the "local" authorities are sovereign 
governments responsible for conducting fiscal policy, national shocks can be 
accommodated by national fiscal policies. 
It could nevertheless be argued that the Maastricht Treaty eliminates 
most of the room for manoeuvre of national fiscal authorities as a result of the 
ceilings imposed on national budget deficits and public debt. This is an 
interpretation that I would not share in so far as the articles of the Treaty 
designed to prevent "excessive deficits" can be construed as requiring that 
deficits should not exceed on average 3% of GDP during the business cycle. 
Given that this would be equivalent, for all practical purposes, to running a 
"cyclically adjusted" deficit as high as 3% of GDP on average, this seems to me 
to be enough to deal with most asymmetric shocks. And while it could be argued 
that budget deficits in Community countries have been significantly greater 
than this figure during the last five years, this should by no means be taken 
as a desirable benchmark given their very unfavourable effects on real interest 
rates and private investment. In fact, recent developments in European public 
finances quite vividly show that there is nothing like fiscal profligacy in "good 
years" to erode the available room for fiscal manouvering in "bad years"; and 
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such room has now become very narrow in the Community given the relatively 
high public debt levels which already existed at the onset of the present 
recession as a result of the failure to achieve fiscal consolidation in the 
previous boom. 
To conclude, in so far as the "excess deficit procedure" of the 
Maastricht Treaty is not too rigidly interpreted, there seems to be significant 
scope for national fiscal policies to smooth macroeconomic adjustment if and 
when "country-wide" asymmetric shocks so require it. Fiscal austerity in "good 
times" would thus be the price to pay to be able to exercise fiscal flexibility in 
"bad times". 
1. 3. Overall assessment of the economic desirability of EMU 
From the previous discussion of the economic costs and benefits 
involved in moving from the present situation to EMU, I would conclude that it 
is likely to be beneficial to the Community as a whole. On the one hand, there 
may be significant benefits associated with the favourable impact of EMU on 
economic and financial integration provided this takes place in an environment 
of more stable prices. On the other hand, since symmetric shocks are likely to 
be more frequent than asymmetric shocks given the production patterns of 
Community countries, and since national fiscal policies can still play a role in 
counteracting the latter within the framework laid out by the Treaty of 
Maastricht, the macroeconomic costs associated with forgoing the present 
degree of intra-EMU nominal exchange rate flexibility are likely to be limited. 
It should nevertheless be noted that the cost/benefit ratio is not 
likely to be equally favourable in all EC countries since there are important 
structural economic differences among them. In this regard, the countries 
which start from the most favourable positions are those whose economies are 
more diversified, more integrated in commercial and financial terms, and whose 
goods and labour markets are freer from structural rigidities. In the remaining 
countries aspiring to become EMU members in the futur.e, the best way to 
improve the relationship between costs and benefits would be to undertake 
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forthwith the necessary structural reforms which would increase the flexibility 
of wages and prices. In this respect, in so far as the nominal convergence 
criteria contained in the Maastricht Treaty induce the above countries to adopt 
the necessary structural policy measures during the transition, the potential 
economic net gains from EMU could be increased even further. 
After having discussed the long-run economic desirability of EMU , 
I turn now to examining the main issues during the transition towards it. 
II. WHERE DO WE STAND? THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSITION 
At the time of writing this paper, Community countries have already 
entered into what the Delors Report called the Second Stage of Economic and 
Monetary Union . The nature of this stage is to serve as a period of preparation 
before entering the Third and final stage where there will be: irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates among Member currencies as a prelude to the single currency ; 
a single monetary policy for the Union formulated by a single European 
monetary authority; and binding constraints on national public finances. 
In this section, I briefly go over two issues which are of importance 
during the transition: the potential for instability , and the impact of the major 
changes in the economic and monetary institutional framework brought about 
by the beginning of Stage Two. 
II .1. ERM instability: causes and consequences 
The so-called transitional stage has always been regarded with 
suspicion by those who believe in the "inconsistent-quarter" , made popular by 
Padoa-Schioppa (1987). Under this proposition, free trade, free capital 
movements and exchange rate stability can mutually and peacefully co-exist 
only if national economic policies are adequately coordinated. Otherwise, there 
would be serious risks of exchange rate instability whlch could undermine very 
seriously not just progress towards EMU but also preserving the degree of 
economic integration already achieved in the Community. 
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The recent evolution of the ERM since the summer of 1992 has 
reminded us of the potential instability of the transition to EMU. Indeed, after 
an extended period of unprecedented stability, between 1987 and August 1992, 
the ERM entered a period of marked exchange rate instability which has led to 
the temporary departure of the Italian Lira and Sterling from the ERM; to 
successive devaluations of other currencies; and, most recently, to the need 
to widen temporarily the fluctuation band between participating currencies to 
± 15%. 
The above facts could be masked to give the appearance that they 
reflect mostly exceptional factors. However, this attitude would be deceptive 
and would also prevent us from properly understanding the causes and 
magnitude of the recent problems as well as from finding a durable solution to 
them. Consequently, it should be acknowledged that the recent ERM crises are 
nothing but the reflection of a number of fundamental problems which, if 
unsolved, would not just jeopardise the regaining of exchange rate stability but 
could also prevent the practical implementation of the legal principles contained 
in the Treaty of Maastricht. 
I am referring to the two kinds of problems which I believe have been 
behind the recent ERM turmoil: firstly, to the inability to coordinate 
sufficiently monetary and especially non-monetary policies among Member 
States, which has led over time to the emergence of competitiveness problems 
and policy dilemmas; and secondly, to the lack of effective mechanisms to 
preserve exchange rate cohesion in the ERM in those cases where it was 
threatened by speculative attacks 14. 
It could perhaps be thought that since the recent widening of the 
ERM bands has coincided with a return to exchange rate stability, little else 
needs to be done. However, this would entirely miss the point since the 
decision to widen the bands was considered as an interim solution to ERM 
problems while more permanent solutions were found. Indeed, the main purpose 
of the wider band has been to restore two-way risk in foreign exchange markets 
and thus to deter speculation. However, let us not deceive ourselves by 
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thinking that this is a sufficient remedy. Unless national policies are adequately 
coordinated and suitable ways are found to share collectively the responsibility 
of preserving the cohesion of the System in the event of speculative attacks, 
even the wider band may not be enough to guarantee a tranquil transition to 
EMU. 
As regards the defense of the cohesion of the ERM, it is of paramount 
importance that national monetary authorities show a strong commitment to 
defending by the appropriate means those central parities which they believe 
are justified on the basis of economic fundamentals. Nevertheless, it must be 
also recognised that since the unilateral defense of exchange rate stability may 
prove, in situations of acute tension, extremely difficult for the weak currency 
country, it would be desirable to devise and implement the technical and 
institutional reforms in the ERM that would lead to more solidarity in the 
defense of the System without jeopardising price stability. This should 
certainly be an important item in the working agendas of European central 
banks. 
As regards coordination, recent experience shows that ERM 
membership by itself does not fully guarantee that such coordination will take 
place. Or, to be more precise, while the exchange rate constraint may be a 
useful focal point for the coordination of national monetary policies, it is 
unfortunately not so useful as regards fiscal policies and wages. In fact, 
during all these years, budget deficits and wages have differed significantly 
among ERM countries, and this has, in turn, prevented a faster reduction of 
inflation and inflation differentials. Consequently, the existence of inadequate 
national policy-mixes has often tended to complicate the task of monetary policy 
by shifting upon its shoulders the burden of achieving both price and exchange 
rate stability. 
On the other hand, while it is true that the asymmetric model of 
national monetary policy coordination in the ERM has been fully accepted by all 
Members in periods of high growth and inflationary pressures in non-German 
ERM countries, it has however tended to be questioned in periods of recession 
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and low inflation in the latter countries . Therefore , it is very important to find 
new ways of fostering coordination that are valid both in "good" and "badl1 
times . This could perhaps be accomplished by complementing the exchange rate 
criterion with the establishment of more explicit medium-term anti-inflationary 
goals. 
II. 2. Changes in the economic and financial framework during the transition 
Needless to say, coordinating national policies is easier said than 
done. However, I would like to point out that a number ?f institutional changes 
have just been made effective as of the beginning of Stage Two which could help 
improve the coordination of monetary policies and achieve a better national 
"policy-mix" in Member countries. Such changes are discussed in what follows . 
11. 2.1. Budget deficits and their financing 
In the fiscal domain, during Stage Two there will be continuous 
multilateral surveillance by the Community authorities on the evolution of 
national public finances to detect the existence of "excessive" budget deficits 
and debt levels . Under the Treaty, budget deficits and debt levels are to be 
considered "excessivel1 when they are respectively above 3% and 60% of GOP and 
do not tend to converge sufficiently rapidly towards these thresholds. 
Nevertheless, it must be acknowleged that the only tool available to Community 
bodies during Stage Two to foster fiscal discipline is moral suasion, since the 
sanctioning procedures established in the Treaty to correct situations of 
inadequate fiscal behaviour are reserved for Stage Three. 
In addition to the above, since the beginning of Stage Two strict laws 
have come into effect for the purpose of prohibiting the direct financing of the 
public sector by central banks as well as its financing in the market under 
privileged conditions . Clearly, the rationale behind these restrictions is to 
make more evident to the public authorities the costs of financing budget 
deficits, and to prevent the financial requirements of governments from 
exerting pressure on national monetary policies . 
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II . 2. 2 .  Monetary policy 
The beginning of Stage Two also has important consequences as 
regards the institutional status of national central banks and the creation of a 
European monetary institution. 
The Treaty of Maastricht stipulates that during Stage Two the 
national central banks of Member States should become independent from the 
political authorities . Accordingly, their statutes will be modified , when 
required, to ensure that central banks can pursue their monetary policy 
objectives without governmental interference and with the necessary 
instruments to achieve these objectives. 
The main reason behind the insistence of the Treaty on the 
independence of national central banks is to establish an institutional framework 
that would facilitate the pursuit by monetary policy of price stability. As is well 
known, there is ample empirical evidence that central bank independence and 
success in fighting inflation are closely related. This notwithstanding, I would 
like to mention that the effects from legislative changes oriented to increasing 
central bank independence will be all the more beneficial if national fiscal 
policies are not at odds with monetary policy. Indeed, as established by 
economic principles and confirmed by experience, the anti-inflationary 
credibility of monetary policy does not only depend on the degree of 
independence of the central bank but on the coherence and credibility of the 
overall macroeconomic policyt' . 
The other major change in the monetary domain during Stage Two is 
the creation of the European Monetary Institute (EM!). Since January 1st 1994 
the EM! has succeeded the Committee of Governors of European Central Banks 
and has been entrusted, among other objectives, with the responsibility for 
reinforcing the coordination of national monetary policies in the Community . 
Although the Treaty clearly states that there will be no transfer of monetary 
policy sovereignty from the national level towards the EM!, the Institute 
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"nevertheless has the possibility of exercising moral suasion on national 
authorities through the publication of its opinions and recommendations . 
While the above changes still fall short from what would be necessary 
to achieve full coordination of national pOlicies, they may nevertheless help to 
move in that direction . In particular , the existence of more independent central 
banks , now free from the obligation to finance budget deficits, and the role 
that the EMI can play in ensuring the mutual consistency of national monetary 
policies, could lead to a situation where the poliCies underpinning exchange 
rate stability within the ERM become more explicitly oriented towards the 
pursuit of the medium-term goal of price stability . 
III. WHERE ARE WE GOING? THE FUTURE EUROPEAN MONETARY POLICY 
In the first section of the paper it was mentioned that the main 
economic benefit to be obtained from EMU would be enhanced economic and 
financial integration in the Community in an environment of price stability . For 
this reason, it is of paramount importance that the future monetary authority , 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB ) ,  is equipped with the mandate 
and the means to pursue the objective of price stability . 
The statutory design of the ESCB has been carefully crafted to 
strengthen its orientation towards the pursuit of a strongly anti-inflationary 
policy. However, a number of very important strategic and tactical questions 
have been left open in the Statute regarding how the future monetary policy 
will be formulated and executed. It is precisely for this reason that the other 
major task of the EM! is to prepare the logistical and institutional framework 
needed for the ESCB to run the single monetary policy effectively and 
efficiently from the first day of Stage Three. This section discusses the above 
issues. 
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IlL ! .  The objectives of the ESCBI6 
ilL ! . ! .  Price stability as the primary objective 
At present, the statutes of a number of central banks in the 
Community include various objectives, extending beyond the protection of the 
domestic and external value of the currency to the promotion of financial 
stability and economic growth. In contrast ,  the Statute of the ESCB sets price 
stability as the primary objective, and establishes that the general economic 
policies in the Community shall be supported as long as this does not conflict 
with price stability . There is no specific definition in the Statute of "price 
stability" nor of the criteria to judge whether the support for other policies 
"conflicts" with price stability." Yet the aim is clear: to avoid the potential 
trade-offs which arise when all the objectives are at par. 
Regarding the desirability of price stability, there is an established 
consensus that inflation is viewed as costly by the publicl7• More importantly, 
both economic principles and historical experience suggest that higher inflation 
is not conducive to higher output growth on a medium-term basis . Indeed, as 
shown by the literature on the "time-consistency problem") when the 
authorities are expected to follow the short-sighted strategy of engineering 
surprise inflation to achieve a higher output level, the resulting time-consistent 
equilibrium is not characterised by higher output but by an inflationary bias. 
And , contrary to the past, there is now a broad consensus among policy-makers 
that price stability constitutes a precondition for achieving sustained economic 
growth. For all of the above reasons , it is very important that the ESCB 
pursues a strongly anti-inflationary policy . Otherwise, a worsening of inflation 
performance in EMU could more than offset the economic benefits of the single 
currency, thus threatening the economic viability of the whole integration 
project. 
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III . 1 .  2 .  The guest for anti-inflationary credibility: Does independence suffice? 
A credible commitment to fight inflation firmly reduces the 
inflationary bias resulting from the time-consistency problem and the short­
term output costs of converging towards price stability . Moreover, as pointed 
out by Begg et a1. (1991) and as empirically documented by Bernanke and 
Mishkin (1992), it increases the freedom of the monetary authorities to respond 
to well-identified shocks without damaging anti-inflationary credibility , as the 
risk that the public may misinterpret a temporary change in liquidity conditions 
for a shift in the stance of monetary policy is reduced. 
But how can the ESCB., a new institution, maximise its 
anti-inflationary credibility? In two ways: through a well-designed monetary 
constitution and through reputation . 
The existence of conflicting policy goals is at the root of the 
inflationary-bias problem . Placing price stability as the primary Objective of the 
ESCB creates a statutory commitment which minimises the risk that several 
objectives conflict in the shorter run and thus reduces the vulnerability of the 
new monetary institution to external pressures to accommodate inflation . 
However, the System must also enjoy independence if price stability is to be 
achieved . 
A distinction can be made between political and economic 
independence, following Grilli et a1. (1991). As concerns political 
independence, several provisions in the Statute try to ensure that the decision­
making bodies of the ESCB will be able to perform their duties without being 
subject to constraints or influence by governments : prohibition of instructions 
from government bodies; compatibility of the statutes of national central banks 
with the Statute of the ESCB; assured tenure for the members of the Council 
and the Executive Board; financial autonomy of the ESCB j and stringent legal 
conditions to amend the Statute in any fundamental way. As concerns economic 
independence , the Statute endows the ESeB with the powers to use monetary 
policy instruments without restrictions : freedom to conduct open market and 
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credit operations and to use other appropriate instruments; power to conduct 
foreign exchange market operations; and the exclusive right to authorise the 
issue of bank-notes in the Community. 
The ESCB ranks quite high in terms of formal independence on the 
basis of a comparison between the statutes of central banks, as confirmed by 
the analysis of Alesina and Grilli (1992). This is important because empirical 
evidence indicates that the average rate of inflation is generally lower in the 
countries with more independent central banks!'. However, even a high degree 
of formal independence is not enough to establish the anti-inflationary 
credibility of the new institution. 
In this respect , some observers have warned that since the Treaty 
places decisions on the exchange rate policy outside the ESCB, the effective 
independence of the new monetary institution migh� be compromised , as the 
monetary stance required to maintain price stability may conflict with exchange 
rate objectivesl9• Although there is more than a grain of truth in this 
argument, it should nevertheless be noted that the wording of the relevant 
articles in the Statute addresses this concern. In particular, although the 
decisions on the conclusion of formal exchange rate arrangements, the 
adjustment or the abandonment of the central rate, and the formulation of 
general orientations of exchange rate policy rest with the Council of the 
European Community, these decisions will be taken only after consulting the 
ESCB in an attempt to reach a consensus consistent with the objective of price 
stability. 
Another source of concern regarding the performance of the ESCB 
is that the degree of tolerance for inflation may be higher in the Union than it 
is now in the country (ies) which at present exert the main influence on the 
monetary conditions in the Community2{). In particular, if the votes in the 
ESCB Council reflect national attitudes to inflation , there is a risk that the 
anti-inflationary stance of the ESCB might be softened, interpreting "price 
stability" in a looser way. However, the standards set in the Treaty for entry 
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into EMU. will act as a screening device for Union membership and may thus 
mitigate this problem. 
Finally , the success of the ESCB in fighting inflation will not only 
depend on itself but also on the behaviour of the fiscal authorities . As 
evidenced by the recent experience of Germany following unification, even an 
independent and reputable central bank like the Bundesbank can face 
difficulties in achieving its anti-inflationary objectives as a result of overly 
expansionary fiscal policies . For this reason, it is crucial that monetary and 
fiscal policies work together towards the pursuit of the overall goal of sustained 
non-inflationary growth . Furthermore, while the inflationary risks posed by an 
"inadequate policy mix" for the Community as a whole exist, the provisions in 
the Maastricht Treaty oriented towards avoiding excessive budget deficit and 
public debt levels limit these risks . In addition, it should be recalled that the 
Statute explicitly prohibits monetary financing of the public sector by ruling 
out the granting of overdrafts (or any other type of credit facility) and the 
purchase of public debt instruments in the primary market. 
IIl . 1 . 3 .  Reputation: earned and inherited 
As pointed out, formal independence is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for achieving anti-inflationary credibility . Once the ESCB starts 
operating,. it must demonstrate its effective independence . In other words, the 
ESCB will still have to build up a reputation to convince both the public and 
governments of its aversion to inflation . Furthermore, the longer it takes the 
ESCB to establish its reputation, the higher the output costs of achieving price 
stability in the Union will be, and the more likely it would be that popular 
discontent may arise with monetary policy. 
As already mentioned, under the institutional design of Stage Two 
envisaged in the Treaty , there is no transfer of monetary sovereignty from the 
national. spheres to the central institution until the beginning of Stage Three, 
contrary to some of the proposals tabled in the discussions on the transition to 
EMU . Consequently , since the precursor of the ESCB, the EM!, will not have 
- 32 -
any monetary policy responsibilities, it will be unable to build up an anti­
inflationary reputation to bequeath to the ECB .  There are, however, good 
reasons to believe that the new monetary institution may inherit some 
credibility . 
The first reason relates to the fulfilment of the convergence 
conditions set in the Treaty for the move to Stage Three. Member States must 
show their resolve in lowering inflation in order to enter the Union , and thus 
the ESCB may inherit , at least partly, the credibility achieved by national 
central banks in the successful process towards EMU. Furthermore , since well­
known unpleasant monetary arithmetic shows that the credibility of monetary 
policy ultimately also depends on the overall macroeconomic policy mix21 , the 
fulfilment of the fiscal convergence conditions during Stage Two and the 
excessive deficit procedure provided for Stage Three should strengthen the 
credibility of the ESCB on its inception. 
The second argument refers to the choice of monetary policy strategy 
and tactics by the ESCB . To the extent that one or several central banks have 
achieved a high degree of anti-inflationary credibility during Stage Two, the 
ESCB could follow similar monetary policy strategies and tactics as a device to 
signal the continuity with past experience and thus to build on the inheritance 
of credibility from certain national central banks . 
In sum, the institutional design of the Treaty goes a long way 
towards endowing the ESCB with the formal independence necessary to run a 
credible anti-inflationary monetary policy . Credibility can also be enhanced 
from the very outset of Stage Three by the preceding compliance with the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, and perhaps by the adoption of certain 
strategies and tactics for the conduct of monetary policy. However, it is the 
degree of success of the ESCB in achieving and maintaining price stability 
during Stage Three which will ultimately forge its credibility over the longer 
term. Let's not forget that for success to be reached it is of paramount 
importance that there is a sound monetary and fiscal policy mix in the Union as 
a whole. 
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III . 2. The formulation and execution of the single monetary policy 
Having discussed the objectives of the ESCB J we now turn to 
examining the main issues involved in the formulation and execution of the 
future European monetary policy. As already mentioned, settling these issues 
is fundamental for the ESCB to run monetary policy efficiently and effectively 
from the beginning of Stage Three . This is why the EMI has been entrusted 
with the responsibility of preparing the single monetary policy during the 
transition . 
The scale and complexity of the task facing the EMI can be readily 
gauged on the basis of the following considerations. 
Firstly, since the Treaty of Maastricht rules out any transfer of 
monetary powers to the EMI during the transition, Stage Three will imply a 
sudden shift from the coexistence of national monetary policies , formulated to 
achieve national objectives and implemented through different procedures , to 
a single monetary policy, set by the ESCB with Union-wide objectives , and 
operated in a consistent way throughout the area . 
And secondly, although the Statute of the ESCB provides the broad 
guidelines for the operation of the future monetary policy , there are numerous 
strategic and tactical issues which are left fully open in the Statute and which 
have yet to be addressed. 
Fortunately , the EMI is not starting from scratch . Over the past 
couple of years , the national central banks of the Community have, within the 
framework of the Committee of Governors , studied a number of key issues 
related to the future single monetary policy . In particular , they have explored: 
the relative advantages of different procedures for implementing monetary 
policy in EMU ; the problems associated with the adaptation and the 
interconnection of national payment systems throughout the Union; the creation 
of an adequate statistical basis which would provide in a timely manner to the 
ESCB the information required to carry out monetary policy; the printing and 
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distributing of the ECU note; the harmonisation of central banks' accounting 
standards and practices; and the interconnection of the information and 
communication systems of national central banks . 
In preparing the single monetary policy, the EMI must address 
several concerns. On the one hand, it must develop an adequate framework for 
formulating monetary policy. This involves considering whether intermediate 
targets in general, and monetary targets in particular, will be useful in the 
conduct of the future monetary policy as well as exploring which variable is 
most suited to play that role. On the other hand, the EMI must study the 
tactical aspects of the execution of monetary policy so as to ensure that the 
single monetary policy is effectively and efficiently run from the very first day 
in full EMU. This involves identifying the minimum requirements for 
guaranteeing the uniformity of monetary conditions throughout the Union and 
exploring the options available to execute the single policy in a decentralised 
form through national central banks. 
I have examined the above issues in detail in a recent paper 
( Monticelli and Vifials, 1993). Therefore , I will confine myself to recalling 
briefly its main conclusions. 
As regards the strategic aspects of formulating the single monetary 
policy, it is likely that national central banks will settle for a framework which 
combines considerable measures of simplicity and transparency and which 
enhances the anti-inflationary credibility of the ESCB. According to some , 
these principles will be best served through the use of intermediate targets 
given their relative advantages in terms of simplicity, transparency, and of 
helping the public to monitor monetary policy and the central bank to avoid 
external pressures . Furthermore, it is argued that since some of the most 
successful central banks in the Community rely at present on intermediate 
monetary targets, this could allow a degree of continuity in the practical 
conduct of monetary policy and, possibly, also"'the transfer of some degree of 
anti-inflationary credibility to the ESCB. Those who argue against monetary 
targets point out that recent experience with monetary targets in a number of 
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European countries has been less than fully satisfactory, as financial innovation 
has tended to progressively erode the stability of the national demand functions 
for these aggregates. While it is too early to say wether monetary aggregates 
will end up playing a central role in the formulation of the future European 
monetary policy, in any case I think that it is very important to avoid a 
mechanistic interpretation of monetary aggregates , especially at the start of 
Stage Three and if such aggregates are explicitly targeted . In particular, the 
regime-change resulting from the irrevocable locking of parities may lead to 
shifts in liquidity preference for the area as a whole, complicating the 
management of monetary policy at the very time where the ESCB has to start 
establishing its anti-inflationary record . 
As regards tactical aspects, it is reasonable to assume that monetary 
policy instruments and procedures will still differ across member countries at 
the start of Stage Three, and that substantive decentralisation will 
characterise, at least in the early years . the execution of the European 
monetary policy. The first assumption is justified because central banks feel 
comfortable with their own way of executing monetary policy and can thus be 
expected to maintain their customary practices, which reflect specific market 
and institutional features . The second assumption rests on the fact that central 
banks have accumulated considerable human capital in terms of knowledge of 
national financial institutions which would not be used if operations were to be 
centralised fully . Over time , I would expect the above arguments gradually to 
lose some force, thus pushing towards greater centralisation in the execution 
of monetary policy. 
In the light of the above considerations, what would be the minimal 
requirements for the conduct of the single monetary policy? The most important 
one is to achieve the integration of national interbank markets so as to ensure 
that interest rate arbitrage brings about a single monetary stance throughout 
the Union . This must rest, in turn} on the integration of national payment 
systems} which permits credit institutions rapidly to transfer their interbank 
pOSitions across borders and to achieve final settlement within the same day. 
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Although not strictly necessary for the above purpose ,  aChieving a 
greater degree of similarity among national monetary policy instruments and 
procedures may also be advocated to prevent regulatory arbitrage and shifts 
in financial location resulting from differences in the cost-subsidy mix implicit 
in the way monetary policy is managed ; and to facilitate the understanding of 
monetary policy signals on the part of market participants. These arguments, 
however, merely point to the benefits of harmonisation and leave the standard 
and terms of harmonisation indeterminate. 
Other key issues which need to be tackled in preparing the technical 
infrastructure for the future monetary policy are the relative importance that 
should be given to the currently available instruments (reserve requirements, 
standing facilities and open market operations) in regulating liquidity 
conditions, and the degree to which policy execution can be delegated to 
national central banks . 
As is well known, over the past years open market operations have 
generally become the main channel through which monetary conditions are 
influenced in Community countries , and money market interest rates the 
principal operational target in the daily conduct of national monetary policies . 
Nevertheless, as described in the last Annual Report of the Committee of 
Governors of EC Central Banks, there are still very significant differences in 
the use which is made in different countries of two other channels for 
regulating liquidity conditions : reserve requirements, and standing facilities . 
For example, while reserve requirements are used significantly in a country 
like Germany , they do not play any role in the United Kingdom. In turn, 
standing facilities play a very important role in the Netherlands and in Germany 
compared with other European countries . 
As regards the issue of decentralisation, while decision-making is 
centralised in accordance with the principle of indivisibility of monetary policy, 
the Statute contemplates the decentralisation of the execution of the single 
monetary policy since, as explicitly stated: "to the extent deemed possible and 
appropriate ( . . .  ) ,  the European Central Bank shall have recourse to the 
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national central banks to carry out operations" .  Undoubtedly, the issue of 
decentralisation in the execution of the future monetary policy is very closely 
related to the final decision taken as regards the relative importance to be 
given to the various instruments and procedures available for regulating 
liquidity conditions. For instance , the management of reserve requirements and 
standing facilities can, provided they are adequately harmonised, be 
decentralised to a much greater extent than open market operations, since the 
latter must be executed in a timely and flexible fashion to offset liquidity 
shocks . 
Although very complex technical issues are involved in comparing the 
merits of alternative models for executing the future monetary policy , what may 
well happen is that an evolutionary model is chosen which, starting from a 
relatively higher degree of decentralisation , can evolve over time towards a 
more centralised system. This would naturally imply that the role of reserve 
requirements £!!.!!! standing facilities would be relatively more important in 
regulating liquidity conditions in the early rather than the later stages of EMU . 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has reviewed some of the most important issues 
concerning the process of European monetary integration .  It draws a number 
of tentative conclusions about its overall economic desirability, the problems 
potentially present during the transition, and the key role to be played by the 
future European monetary authority. 
Firstly, regarding the economic desirability of EMU; it is suggested 
that it will be economically advantageous for the Community as a whole. In 
particular , there will be significant benefits from fostering economic and 
financial integration provided this takes place in an environment of more stable 
prices . Furthermore, the costs associated with renouncing the exchange rate 
as a tool for macroeconomic adjustment are smaller than sometimes claimed since 
symmetric shocks are likely to be relatively frequent given the production 
- 38-
patterns of Community countries , and since national fiscal policies have enough 
room for manoeuvre to offset asymmetric shocks . 
This notwithstanding, present differences in national economic 
structures imply that the relationship between benefits and costs is not likely 
to be equally favourable in all Member countries. In particular J those economies 
with less flexible goods and labour markets are likely to experience relatively 
more important costs in terms of macroeconomic instability. In the latter 
economies , the best way to improve the relationship between costs and benefits 
is to undertake forthwith the necessary structural reforms which would 
increase the flexibility of wages and prices .  In this respect, in so far as the 
nominal convergence criteria contained in the Maastricht Treaty induce the 
above countries to adopt the necessary structural policy measures during the 
transition. the potential economic net gains from EMU could be increased even 
further. 
Secondly J concerning the transitional period, the potential problems 
of maintaining exchange rate stability in the ERM in an environment of free 
trade and capital movements can only be solved by strengthening the 
coordination of national economic policies in the direction of promoting sustained 
non-inflationary growth, as well as by implementing the necessary changes to 
safeguard ERM cohesion in the presence of speculative attacks . These are 
undoubtedly important tasks for the European Monetary Institute and national 
central banks . 
Thirdly, the whole balance between the costs and benefits to be 
obtained from EMU depends critically on the orientation of the future monetary 
policy to be conducted by the European System of Central Banks. Accordingly , 
the institutional design of the future European monetary authority gives 
primacy to the objective of price stability and goes a long way towards ensuring 
the economic and political independence which is required to establish the anti­
inflationary credibility of the new monetary institution. Furthermore , the 
reduction of national inflation rates and of budget deficits, which needs to be 
made during the transition to comply with the EMU-membership convergence 
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conditions set in the Maastricht Treaty, plus the processes set in motion to 
make national central banks independent will play an important role in ensuring 
that the anti-inflationary objective is widely shared by future EMU members . 
In addition, the role played by the European Monetary Institute in the next few 
years in preparing the technical and lOgistical framework needed to conduct the 
future monetary policy is of paramount importance . In this regard, the 
decisions which are finally taken regarding to the strategy and tactics of the 
European monetary policy will be crucial in shaping its effectiveness and 
underpinning its overall anti-inflationary orientation. 
Finally , while the paper has concluded that European monetary 
integration is a desirable development from the economic point of view, what it 
has not tackled is the more difficult question of identifying the minimal elements 
of political integration which are needed for EMU to be sustainable. This issue 
will be discussed in the forthcoming European Intergovernmental Conference 
on Political Union starting in 1996. 
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NOTES 
1 .  See Werner Report (1970) for the original document, and Gros 
and Thygesen (1992) for a description of the circumstances that 
surrounded the launching and later shelving of the Werner Plan. 
2 .  See Delers Report (1989) and the collection of papers attached. 
3 .  See Treaty on European Union (1992) . 
4. On this point see Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989 ) .  
5. Critical views on EMU have recently been voiced by Feldstein 
( 1 993) and Krugman ( 1 992) . 
6. Throughout the paper it is implicitly assumed that a single 
currency will be circulating in EMU . Thus the discussion of the 
costs and benefits of the European monetary union should be 
related to those incurred when moving from the present situation 
to a single currency. 
7 .  For some recent surveys on the costs and benefits of EMU see: 
European Commission (1990) , De Grauwe (1992) , Eichengreen 
(1992 ) ,  Gras and Thygesen (1992) , Masson and Taylor (1993) , 
and Goodhart (1993 ) .  
8 .  The paper by Goodhart (1993) explores the politicial economy 
issues surounding EMU and makes this and other interesting 
points . 
9 .  See, for example, Eichengreen ( 1 993) , De Grauwe and 
Vanhaverbeke (1993) , Bini-Smaghi and Vori (1993 ) ,  and 
Decressin and Fatas (1992) . 
1 0 .  A review of the recent ERM experience and its impact o n  inflation 
is made by Svensson ( 1 994 ) .  
1 1 .  See Barra and Gordon (1983) and De Grauwe (1992) . 
1 2 .  Among the former, see DECD (1989) and Jackman , Layard and 
Nickell (1991 ) ;  among the latter, see Eichengreen ( 1992) , Bean 
(1993) and Bini-Smaglll and Vori ( 1 993 ) .  
1 3 .  See Sachs and Sala-i-Martin ( 1 992) and Von Hagen ( 1 991 ) . 
Goodhart (1993) clearly summarises the results from these and 
other studies . 
- 4 1 -
1 4 .  Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) discuss the recent ERM crises 
and the role of speculative capital flows . Among the official 
reports on the ERM crises, see Committee of Governors (1993) , 
Monetary Committe (1993) and Group of Ten (1993) . 
15 . Swinburne and Castello-Branco (1991) survey the main issues 
surrounding the economic impact of central bank independence . 
1 6 .  This section draws heavily o n  Monticelli and Vifials ( 1993) . 
1 7 .  See, for example , European Commission ( 1990) and Gros and 
Thygesen (1992) . 
1 8 .  Recent studies on this issue are Alesina ( 1989) , Grilli et a1. 
( 1990) and European Commission (1990) . 
19.  Among others . see Begg e t  al. ( 1 992) and Kenen ( 1 992) . 
20 . On this point , see Begg et a1. (1992) and Currie (1992) . 
21 . Sargent and Wallace ( 1 981)  and Swinburne and Castello-Branco 
( 1991 ) .  
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